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The twentieth century became the human capital century.1 No nation
today—no matter how poor—can afford not to educate its youth at the
secondary school level and beyond. But at the start of the twentieth
century even the world’s richest countries—richer in per capita terms
than many poor nations are today—had not yet begun the transition to
mass secondary school education. There was one exception, the nation
that led the world in mass secondary and mass higher education: the
United States.
The United States accomplished the feat of mass education by
creating a new and unique educational pattern or gauge—I will call it a
“template”—that broke from the templates of Europe. The U.S. template
was shaped by egalitarian institutions—a commitment to equality of
opportunity; by New World factor endowments—lots of land relative to
labor; and by republican ideology—meaning democracy and pluralism.
For much of the twentieth century, the template was synonymous
with a set of “virtues.” That is, the template consisted of characteristics
that were virtuous. Among the virtues of mass secondary education were
that it was publicly funded; managed by numerous small, ﬁscally
independent districts; open and forgiving; academic yet practical in its
curriculum; secular in control; and gender-neutral in its admission. I call
these characteristics virtues because they promoted and furthered mass
education and thereby increased social mobility and enhanced economic
growth.
What brought about the human capital century? Why and how did
*Henry Lee Professor of Economics, Harvard University.
1 This address draws on Goldin (2001).the United States lead the world in mass education for much of the
twentieth century? What does this history mean for the future of
education in the United States?
Why Do I Claim That the Twentieth Century Was the Human
Capital Century?
Even poor countries today have a far greater rate of secondary school
enrollment than did the rich countries of the past. Consider Figure 1, for
which the horizontal axis is real per capita income in 1990 (as represented
by GDP) and the vertical axis is the enrollment rate of youths in upper
secondary school in 1990. The lowest of the four stars in the ﬁgure
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in the United States in 1900, just before secondary school education took
off in the United States’ high school movement.
Two quadrants in the diagram have unambiguous interpretations—
the northwest and southeast. I term the northwest quadrant the “good
education” quadrant and the southeast quadrant the “bad education”
quadrant. By the “good education” quadrant, I mean that nations found
in it had lower real incomes in 1990 than the United States did in 1900 but
a higher enrollment rate in 1990 than the United States had in 1900. By the
“bad education” quadrant, I mean that the nations located in it had a
higher income but a lower enrollment rate than the United States in 1900.
No nation is in the bad quadrant and many are in the good quadrant. One
can do the same thought experiment for other years. Figure 1 also
contains a data point for the United States in 1920 and, once again, no
country is located in the bad quadrant. The data point for 1940 places just
a few countries in the bad quadrant. Only when the 1960 data point for
the United States is considered do more than a handful of countries fall
into the bad quadrant.
Two highly useful facts are embedded in these data and the thought
experiment. The ﬁrst fact—and it will be clearer in a moment—is that
secondary schooling “took off” in the United States from around 1910 to
1940. The second fact is that the bad quadrant was virtually empty until
the United States achieved very high enrollment rates, and the good
quadrant was often brimming with countries. This demonstration sug-
gests that even poor nations and poor people today invest in secondary
schooling to a far greater degree than did the educational leader of the
past. Thus, the twentieth century became the human capital century.
Nations can no longer afford to be left behind in educating their people
because today’s technologies are produced by higher-education countries
and are designed for an educated labor force.
The notions that “people skills” matter, that the wealth of a nation is
embodied in its people, and that only an educated people can adopt,
adapt, and innovate new technologies were voiced in America at the
dawn of the twentieth century. In 1906, the governor of Massachusetts
appointed a commission to study technical education and assigned the
chairmanship to Carroll Wright—one of the greatest U.S. labor statisti-
cians of all time, the ﬁrst Massachusetts Commissioner of Labor, and the
ﬁrst Commissioner of the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics. The report of
the Wright Commission concluded: “We know that the only assets of
Massachusetts are its climate and its skilled labor” (Roman 1915). (Give
the author half credit.) The modern concept of the wealth of nations had
emerged. What mattered was capital embodied in people—human capital.
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Century?
In the nineteenth century, machines and natural resources, not
people, mattered to the industrial giants—Britain, Germany, France, and
the United States. But in the early 1900s, attention began to shift to the
education of the people at the secondary and higher levels.
A new economy—as it was termed by contemporaries—had
emerged in the early twentieth century. It involved a greater use of
science by industry, a proliferation of academic disciplines, a series of
critical inventions and their diffusion (for example, small electric motors,
the internal combustion engine, the airplane, various chemical processes),
the rise of big business, and the growth of retailing. A host of demand-
side factors increased the relative demand for educated labor and
enhanced the returns to education and training.
These changes did more than increase the demand for a small cadre
of scientists and engineers. They increased the demand for skilled and
educated labor among the mass of workers. Firms began to seek employ-
ees with a host of general skills. They sought a white-collar and clerical
staff capable of using the latest ofﬁce machinery, with modern ofﬁce skills
(such as stenography and typing), polished grammar, and some mathe-
matical prowess. They also sought blue-collar workers who could deci-
pher manuals, who could use algebra, and who had a mastery of
mechanical drawing and a familiarity with chemical and electrical
fundamentals.
A remarkable notion had emerged around 1900—it was that school-
ing could make the ordinary ofﬁce clerk, the shop-ﬂoor worker, and even
the farmer more productive. The odd thing is that even though most
industrial nations acknowledged the change from physical capital to
human capital, only one did much about it until well into the twentieth
century.
How Didthe UnitedStates Leadthe Worldin Mass Ed ucation?
The demand for educated labor increased, and almost nationwide
there was an outpouring of public and primarily local resources to build
and staff high schools. These schools were academic (not industrial), free,
secular, gender-neutral, open, and forgiving. The educational change was
known then as the “high school movement.” In the United States as a
whole, the enrollment rate for youths in all secondary schools—public
high schools, private secular and religious high schools, and the prepa-
ratory departments of colleges and universities—soared from 1910 to
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high school graduate, but in 1940 the median youth had a high school
diploma. The contemporaneous graduation rate, expressed as a fraction
of the relevant age group, also increased substantially during the same
period. It is no wonder that those who lived through the early part of the
period termed the change “one of the most remarkable educational
movements of modern times” (California Department of Public Instruc-
tion 1914).
The high school movement was not just an urban phenomenon, and
it was not just a New England phenomenon, although it began there. It
quickly spread from New England towns to the rich agricultural areas in
the central part of the country and to the western states. Because the
southern states had lower levels of educational attainment for much of
the twentieth century and because the high school movement diffused
slowly throughout the South, the national data in Figure 2 give a
2 High school or secondary school is historically deﬁned in the United States as grades
9 through 12 (even if grade 9 is offered in a junior high school) and it generally includes
youths from ages 14 or 15 to 17 or 18. For further details, see Goldin (1998, 1999).
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ment throughout the rest of the country. High schools spread consider-
ably faster in most other regions of the country, and graduation and
enrollment rates were higher, as can be seen in the graduation rates of
Figure 3. Even before 1930, graduation rates for 18-year-olds in many
parts of the North, Midwest, and West exceeded the 50 percent mark.
In 1910, when the data on graduation rates begin, New England was
the leading region. But by the mid-1910s, the rich states of the Paciﬁc had
closed in on New England, and by the 1920s, even the sparsely settled
and agricultural states of the West North Central (consisting of states
such as Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska) had exceeded the rates achieved in
New England. Only the Middle Atlantic states were left behind, but they
caught up during the massive unemployment of the Great Depression,
when jobs for teens evaporated overnight and education became a more
attractive alternative. In 1940, as the world braced for yet another war,
America could boast the most educated workforce in the world. It
accomplished this feat even though, for much of the period, it had opened
its doors to the poor of the world. America’s success in mass secondary
education resulted from its educational template and the associated
virtues.
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ized by quasi-public or private funding and provision, by the high
standards of an unforgiving system, by the unity of church and state, and
by a “boys come ﬁrst” attitude. The German, British, and French
templates or systems, while different in their details, had much in
common—strict standards, individual accountability, severe tracking at
early ages, and higher education for a small, elite corps. Most of these
systems had centralized bureaucracies and ﬁnances, and some had
elaborate apprenticeship systems.
By the mid-1950s, the United States’ lead in the human capital
century was astoundingly large. A wide gap existed between the educa-
tion of youth in Europe and in the United States. Across the 12 European
countries in Figure 4, only one (Sweden) had a full-time, general
education enrollment rate for 15- to 19-year-olds that exceeded 20
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plus full-time technical educational enrollment rate that exceeded 30
percent. The U.S. enrollment rate for the same age group in 1955 was
almost 80 percent. Even if one adds to the European data youths in
part-time technical education, enrollment rates would still be consider-
ably lower than in the United States. Only in the past three decades has
the difference between the secondary school enrollment rate of the United
States and that of Europe been largely eliminated and the lower quality
of U.S. secondary school education become a major U.S. domestic issue.
Why did the United States at the turn of the twentieth century break
from the educational and training templates of Europe and pioneer a
novel form of secondary education? Why did Europeans believe that
Americans were wasting resources by educating their masses? Why did
Americans reject a highly speciﬁc, on-the-job, industrial form of educa-
tion (such as the British, Danish, and German apprenticeship systems) in
favor of one that was general, school-based, and academic? The answers
to these questions concern basic differences between the New World and
the Old World.
Formal, general education is more valued when geographic mobility
and technical change are greater. School, not an apprenticeship and job
training, enables a youth to change occupations over his lifetime, to
garner skills different from his parents’, and to respond rapidly to
technological change. The U.S. template was not wasteful in the techno-
logically dynamic, socially open, and geographically mobile New World
setting. And, more important, it probably enhanced the dynamism.
Follow my reasoning thus far: A host of changes beginning in the late
nineteenth century increased the demand for certain skills and knowl-
edge. A set of republican institutions enabled the United States to
respond to the increased demand for skill; these institutions, together
with a set of New World preconditions (such as a high ratio of land to
labor), meant that the United States responded to the technological
imperative in a particular way. By the early twentieth century, the United
States began to endow a large fraction of its youth with skills in formal,
school-based, academic settings, using the U.S. template. The United
States achieved mass secondary (and later mass higher) education
because of a set of virtues that enabled the supply-side institutions to
respond to the demand-side shift.
How did the virtues accomplish so much? Take decentralization, for
example. In a state where public support for school expansion was less
than 50 percent, the existence of numerous small, ﬁscally independent
districts would enable high schools to diffuse. People choose where to
live, and small districts are generally more homogeneous than are large
districts with respect to income, ethnicity, religion, and cultural values. It
is likely, therefore, that individual preferences for public goods are more
similar the smaller the geographic area. Greater homogeneity means that
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the districts, whereas there would be no funding if the district were the
size of the state. In contrast to the United States, educational decisions
were highly centralized in much of Europe. National legislation (in
Britain and France, for example) was required to fund secondary school
expansion, and it initially diffused more slowly than it did in the United
States.
In the United States, about 130,000 separate school districts existed
around 1925, but many were tiny common school districts of the open
country, and some did not have the ability to set their own tax rates. That
still left tens of thousands of ﬁscally independent school districts of a
large enough size in the early part of the twentieth century to establish a
public secondary school. These relatively small, ﬁscally independent
school districts implicitly competed with each other to attract residents.
In work that Lawrence Katz and I have done using archival records
from a unique state census, we found that an additional year of high
school at the start of the high school movement in 1915 added more than
12 percent to the earnings of young men (18 to 34 years old). This return
was almost double that for an additional year of secondary school in
1955.3 Returns were substantial even within various occupations. That is,
whether a youth were somehow destined to be a blue-collar or a
white-collar worker, there would still be signiﬁcant returns to further
education. The return to education, furthermore, was as high for farmers
as it was for those in nonagricultural occupations.
What impact did the U.S. template have on economic growth and
individual welfare? I’ll give just one part of the answer: It had a major
impact on economic inequality.4 As more individuals gained more years
of education in the ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, inequality declined.
The structure of wages narrowed, wage ratios for higher-skilled relative
to lesser-skilled positions fell, and the returns to education decreased. All
of the data sets I have examined show declining inequality for the period
from the late 1910s to the 1950s. And they also show rising inequality
after the mid-1970s. If we think of the wage structure as being the result
of a race between technology and education, then education ran faster
than technology in the ﬁrst half of the century, and technology ran faster
than education in the second half. Interestingly, technology does not
appear to have accelerated after the 1970s. Rather, advances in educa-
tional attainment slowed down, in part because of demographics. But
that issue must wait for another talk.
3 See Goldin and Katz (2000).
4 For evidence on changes in inequality across the twentieth century, see Goldin and
Katz (2001).
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The U.S. template (characterized by virtues) succeeded during the
ﬁrst half of the twentieth century, and for some time after, it did better
than those of other nations. The system produced far more educated
citizens and workers. It did not, by and large, reinforce class distinctions
but, rather, it enabled economic and geographic mobility and resulted in
a large decrease in inequality in economic outcomes. It may also have
increased technological change and thus labor productivity, although
that is far more difﬁcult to prove.
The virtues I have mentioned include the following: education that
was publicly funded and publicly provided; an open and forgiving
system; an academic yet practical curriculum; numerous small, ﬁscally
independent school districts; and secular (not church) control of
schools. But these characteristics are no longer seen as uniformly virtu-
ous. To some, they now constrain, rather than further, education. For
example:
• Public or community funding and public provision were the
hallmarks of the common school system. But vouchers—
public funding but private provision—and charter schools
are now being used and considered for use to increase
competition. (Thomas Downes discusses these subjects in his
paper for this conference.)
• An open and forgiving system without tracking at early ages
was seen as egalitarian and non-elitist. But this type of
system is now viewed as lacking both standards and account-
ability. Almost all states today have standards for grade
promotion, high school graduation, school funding, and
teacher retention. Some of these standards are strict and
have serious consequences for those who do not pass. (Eric
Hanushek and Margaret Raymond, and John Bishop, in their
contributions for this conference, assess whether standards
and accountability have positive effects on a variety of
outcomes and, therefore, whether they are truly virtuous.)
• A general, academic education for all may enhance ﬂexibility
ex ante, but may, ex post, leave many behind and may have
worsened rising inequality. Some have recently espoused
technical and vocational training for certain youths.
• Although a decentralized system of small, ﬁscally indepen-
dent districts competing for residents once fostered educa-
tional investments, these systems are now seen as producing
serious funding inequities. State equalization plans are cur-
rently in effect in most states, although some plans (such as
that in California) have led many to exit the public system
and may actually reduce spending per child in poor districts.
34 Claudia Goldin(Thomas Downes summarizes this literature in his paper for
this conference.)
• The separation of church and state encouraged a common
education for all. But an insistence on the secular control of
public funds would mean that Catholic and other church-
based schools could not receive publicly funded vouchers,
even in academically failing school districts where other
private schools are unavailable to poor students. The recent
Supreme Court ruling on this important issue (Zelman v.
Simmons Harris on June 27, 2002) may widen the use of
vouchers by denominational schools, not just by those in
failing school districts.
In conclusion, the twentieth century was the human capital century.
America led other nations by a wide margin in the provision of general,
formal education to the masses and did so because of characteristics—
virtues—that were shaped by New World endowments and republican
ideology. Almost all of these virtues are now being questioned, and in the
twenty-ﬁrst century an entirely new set of virtues could emerge.
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